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Abstract
Near Field Communication (NFC) is being used in a variety of
security-critical applications, from access control to payment
systems. However, NFC protocol analysis typically requires
expensive or conspicuous dedicated hardware, or is severely
limited on smartphones. In 2015, the NFCGate proof of con-
cept aimed at solving this issue by providing capabilities for
NFC analysis employing off-the-shelf Android smartphones.
In this paper, we present an extended and improved NFC
toolkit based on the functionally limited original open-source
codebase. With in-flight traffic analysis and modification,
relay, and replay features this toolkit turns an off-the-shelf
smartphone into a powerful NFC research tool. To support
the development of countermeasures against relay attacks,
we investigate the latency incurred by NFCGate in different
configurations.
Our newly implemented features and improvements enable
the case study of an award-winning, enterprise-level NFC
lock from a well-known European lock vendor, which would
otherwise require dedicated hardware. The analysis of the
lock reveals several security issues, which were disclosed to
the vendor.
1 Introduction
With the continuous advance of contactless applications, in-
cluding payment and access control systems, the potential for
abuse and security breaches is on the rise. This is exemplified
by the recent increase of smartphone-based contactless pay-
ment transactions using Near Field Communication (NFC)
[46, 58] and the expansion of NFC capabilities for apps on
popular mobile platforms [4, 9]. Contactless payment systems
have been shown to be susceptible to various attacks [10, 21,
22, 23, 48, 49, 55]. Research of potential attacks on NFC pro-
tocols commonly uses Android devices or dedicated hardware
to capture NFC traffic. While dedicated hardware provides
several advantages in versatility as well as advanced features,
*Both authors contributed equally to this research.
such as supported technologies, it is also expensive and can be
difficult to use [37, 45]. In contrast, ordinary Android devices
look less suspicious in public, are readily available, generally
affordable, but usually limited in its set of features compared
to dedicated hardware.
NFCGate, whose proof of concept (PoC) was originally
presented as a demo by Maass et al. in 2015 [42], is a research
toolkit for active NFC protocol analysis compatible with the
Android platform, which can take advantage of the NFC stack
and act as a programmable NFC device. It provides both the
basic features for ordinary Android devices as well as ad-
vanced features similar to those found on dedicated hardware,
while maintaining availability and affordability. Even though
the original PoC was able to relay NFC traffic, clone card
identifiers, and provided basic logging functionality, it had
limited compatibility with NFC technologies and chipsets.
In this work, we describe the updated version of NFCGate
[53], including its original and new functionality, with regards
to networking and NFC communication. In particular, our
contributions include:
• New modes: replay capabilities for captured NFC traffic,
on-device mode for capturing traffic system-wide.
• Python-based plugin system for analyzing and modify-
ing traffic on-the-fly.
• Improvements to the clone mode for duplicating static
tag data of different NFC technologies.
• Extension of the relay mode for wormhole attacks.
Using NFCGate, we also conduct a security analysis of
an NFC-based smart lock as a case study and evaluate the
security of its protocol and implementation to demonstrate the
toolkit. Since the lock is not compatible with Android’s NFC
stack by default, this case study would not be possible without
NFCGate, which enables active attacks on the underlying
protocol. Finally, we evaluate the additional latency generally
introduced by the use of NFCGate in multiple real-world
scenarios and discuss potential countermeasures.
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2 Background
In this section, we provide background information on the
techniques and technologies used in NFCGate. We discuss
NFC standards, the NFC software stack, and function hooking
on Android.
2.1 NFC Standards
The Android NFC stack currently supports four basic types
of technologies: NFC-A, NFC-B, NFC-F, and NFC-V [8].
Terminology While NFC endpoints come in various shapes
and sizes, e.g. passive cards, active tags, or even card emu-
lators, the communication in standards is usually defined
between two endpoints: Proximity Integrated Circuit Card
(PICC) and Proximity Coupling Device (PCD). A PICC is
a device in the tag role and a PCD is an endpoint in the
reader role. While establishing a connection between these
endpoints, the PICC exchanges some static tag data with the
PCD to initialize the communication. This data depends on
the type of NFC technology and can be used to help the PCD
decide between multiple available tags. To exchange data
after initialization, messages are sent with the Application
Protocol Data Unit (APDU) encapsulated in their payload.
NFC-A/B The ISO/IEC 14443 family of standards consists
of four parts, describing the different layers in standardized
NFC communication. While Part 1 describes the physical
properties of NFC at the lowest level [29], Part 4 specifies
the “half-duplex block transmission protocol” [30] used to
transfer APDUs between NFC-enabled endpoints of type A
and B. Several open and proprietary protocols are built on top
of this protocol and allow for higher-level operations such as
authentication, file access, and cryptographic computations
to be performed on the tag. For example, one of these open
protocols is defined in the ISO/IEC 7816-4 Interindustry Card
Standard (ICS) [32, 33], while the widely used Mifare DES-
Fire is a proprietary protocol [44].
The transport layer also includes the negotiation of a Frame
Waiting Time (FWT), which is specified by the PICC as i, and
allows the PCD to retransmit a message if no response was
received within the interval [30, Section 7.2]. It is defined as
follows:
FWTi =
(
256 ·16
13.56MHz
)
·2i 0≤ i≤ 14
NFC-F Similarly, the JIS X 6319-4 standard specifies,
among other things, the physical properties and the transmis-
sion protocol for “high-speed proximity cards” [34], which
Sony FeliCa (NFC-F) complies with. Despite its similarities
to ISO/IEC 14443, this standard is incompatible and requires
both PICC and PCD to support the tag technology.
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Figure 1: Architecture of the Android NFC stack.
NFC-V In contrast to the previous technologies, the vicin-
ity standard ISO/IEC 15693 (NFC-V) [31] achieves signifi-
cantly more distance than ISO/IEC 14443, but trades some
throughput for it. Due to its different physical properties re-
sulting from the operation at a greater distance, this standard
is incompatible to ISO/IEC 14443 and does not mandate the
implementation of any transport protocol beyond exchanging
the static tag data.
NCI The NFC Controller Interface (NCI) standard [43]
specifies the high-level communication protocol between an
NCI-conforming NFC controller and the application proces-
sor using various underlying transport mechanisms, e.g., I2C.
Most importantly, NCI defines sending configuration streams
to the NFC Controller (NFCC), which modify a standardized
setting with each option in the stream. Setting these options
can change the way the NFCC presents itself to other readers
during card emulation, including emulating static tag data.
While the sending of such streams is not supported as an API
by Android, it exists internally and could be accessed through
binary instrumentation.
2.2 Android NFC Stack
The Android NFC stack in general consists of multiple layers
ranging from the underlying NFC chipset to the high-level
programming interfaces available through the Android SDK.
Figure 1 outlines the architecture of the Android NFC stack.
The lowest level consists of the NFC chipset and the NFC
controller, which interacts with the controller-specific kernel
driver, usually via a transport bus like I2C or UART. The
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communication then leaves the kernel-space and continues
in the user-space with the hardware abstraction layer (HAL)
that chipset manufacturers are required to implement. This
eliminates the need for chipset-specific adjustments of the
user-space NFC stack. As of now, the Android Open Source
Project ships with Broadcom and NXP HAL implementations
[1]. It consists of native libraries and Java framework classes.
Of those native libraries, the NCI library communicates with
the HAL and delivers results to the NFC service using the
Java Native Interface (JNI). When using the NFC API in the
Android SDK, every app communicates with the privileged
NFC service.
2.3 Android HCE
Host Card Emulation (HCE) allows Android-based smart-
phones with NFC to emulate tags for all use-cases where the
phone takes the role of the tag, e.g. Google Pay [2]. In order to
support multiple HCE applications for different purposes on a
single smartphone, Android employs a complex Application
Identifier (AID) routing mechanism. This requires Android to
terminate the ISO/IEC 7816-4 ICS connection and intercept
the initial SELECT message containing the AID, which is then
used to route the requests to the correct application registered
for the AID. This artificial limitation prevents Android from
accepting any requests not conforming to ICS or not starting
with the expected SELECT message.
2.4 Android Function Hooking
Hooking is used to intercept regular function calls within for-
eign applications to modify or extend existing functionality.
By injecting instructions into the target function, hooking al-
lows the modification of its control-flow, parameters, return
value, and behavior [41]. Because Android applications con-
sist of Java code with optional native code connected via the
JNI, two types of function hooking exist.
Java Function Hooking. Since the Java byte code is ex-
ecuted in a Java virtual machine, it is independent of the
underlying platform architecture. As a consequence, func-
tion hooking in Java is also platform-independent. While the
complex process architecture on Android requires significant
engineering effort to allow modifications to its virtual ma-
chine, the well-known hooking frameworks Xposed [50] and
EdXposed [51] accomplish general Java function hooking by
replacing the virtual machine entirely. These frameworks en-
able application extensions to alter the behavior of any other
application on the system.
Native Function Hooking. In contrast to Java code, native
instructions are tied to the processor architecture. Android
applications using native code have to provide binaries for
all targeted architectures. Consequently, hooking native code
requires platform-specific techniques as well. In order to hook
native functions, a hooking application substitutes instructions
in the target process with the desired behavior. Of the several
options that exist for function hooking techniques [38, 41,
56], the method we use is procedure linkage table hooking
provided by the xHook library [28].
3 Related Work
While many software-based tools for the analysis of NFC-
based protocols have been developed, these tools are mostly
tied to their specific use-case. In addition, they operate on high
levels in the NFC software stack, so that their control of the
underlying chipset is limited to that of the available operating
system APIs. One of the first software-based NFC tools for
relaying APDUs over the network dates back to 2011 [21]
and uses a Nokia 6131 as the reader and a BlackBerry 9900 as
the card emulator. It shows the applicability of relay attacks
on applications using ISO/IEC 14443 APDUs and compares
timings of smart cards and the relay.
Another software-based tool [55] uses HCE on the widely
available Android operating system to passively (unmodi-
fied) relay APDUs over the network. With this approach, the
tool is able to successfully relay a MasterCard contactless
transaction from New York (USA) to Madrid (Spain). Due
to limitations on the Android platform, the tool requires the
first APDU to be a ICS SELECT command with a previously
registered AID. While a separate Xposed module can be used
to circumvent the AID restriction, the tool cannot bypass the
ICS requirement. Additionally, the tool cannot emulate static
tag data due to a lack of platform support.
In a similar way, the discontinued NFCProxy tool [40] uses
basic Android HCE to relay NFC traffic. Due to its short
development time, NFCProxy lacks advanced features and
bypasses for Android platform restrictions. Despite its short-
comings, NFCProxy is used in a PoC attack on the payment
systems Visa payWave (qVSDC) and EMV contactless [10].
Table 1 gives a quick comparison of the aforementioned tools
with respect to their features and properties.
Since the introduction of Google Wallet, NFC-based mo-
bile payment systems have become a point of interest for secu-
rity researchers. One particular analysis of Google Wallet [49]
uses a combination of software- and hardware-based tools to
relay APDUs from the phone’s secure element to a dedicated
hardware-based card emulator. This approach requires non-
trivial modifications to the operating system in order to access
the secure element. Since its publication, Google has fixed
this particular attack vector and introduced HCE, eliminating
the need for using the secure element. Google Wallet (now
Google Pay) has since moved to HCE [24], which has seen
widespread usage [58].
With the rise of electronic vehicles in Germany, a surge
of integrated and cheap charging stations from different
providers attracts the interest of security researchers. Due
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Table 1: Feature comparison of NFCGate to other NFC tools.
Tool Protocols Availability Usability and Handling Price
NFCProxy [40], [21, 55] Only ISO/IEC 7816 APDUs Android Inconspicuous, no additional hardware $
Proxmark3 [45] Any on ISO/IEC 14443 Dedicated hardware Suspicious, requires USB host $$$
ChameleonMini [37] Any on ISO/IEC 14443 Dedicated hardware Suspicious, requires USB host $$
NFCGate Any on ISO/IEC 14443 Android (rooted) Inconspicuous, no additional hardware $
to the simplicity of the charging stations, they do not feature
regular payment processing. Instead, many providers rely on
lightweight customized billing systems with a supplied to-
ken for user authentication. For example, some providers use
NFC-based smartcards as hardware tokens as analyzed by
Dalheimer [18]. He shows that despite the usage of Mifare
Classic tags supporting cryptographic operations, some sys-
tems only use static tag data as authentication for billing. This
allows cloning the tag using a hardware-based NFC tool [37,
45], which emulates the static tag data.
The security of contactless payment systems generally re-
lies on the assumption of the limited range of NFC. However,
the ReCoil attack [52] shows that this premise does not hold.
Using a passive (unpowered) relay consisting of antenna coils
and a waist band, the NFC communication range can be ex-
tended up to 49.6cm. This allows an attacker to relay the
NFC traffic over a distance, thus bypassing physical security
measures.
4 Implementation
While the Android operating system acts as an integrated
NFC reader enabling apps to communicate with tags freely,
tag emulation is much more limited. The HCE functional-
ity of Android allows the emulation of applications based
on ISO/IEC 7816 ICS, but has no option to mimic static tag
data, which restricts its functionality for NFC security anal-
ysis. NFCGate is an Android application that circumvents
these restrictions by using symbol hooking in managed (Java)
and native (C/C++) code to gain low-level access to the An-
droid NFC stack. It is compatible with devices supporting the
Xposed [50] or EdXposed [51] hooking framework.
As the code of NFCGate has undergone many changes,
we focus on the technical implementation of the following
features of NFCGate, where Table 2 distinguishes the original
PoC from the current version of NFCGate:
• Standardized logging format. Logging NFC traffic in the
standardized packet capture format pcapng [54] enables
the use of packet analyzers with advanced dissectors,
such as Wireshark [16].
• Clone mode. The clone mode allows the emulation of
static tag data for NFC-A, NFC-B, and NFC-F technolo-
gies.
• Relay mode. The relay mode features a server software
with a Python plugin system for analyzing and modifying
traffic on-the-fly.
• Replay mode. This mode replays previously recorded
or imported traffic in either reader or tag role locally
without a relay setup, or remotely with on-the-fly traffic
modifications.
• On-device capture mode. Capturing system-wide NFC
traffic from other apps running on the Android device
allows the analysis of HCE-based applications as well
as NFC reader applications.
4.1 Logging and Interoperability
When NFCGate processes NFC traffic, it is logged to the app’s
private storage in a database. The app provides an overview
of these logs, their timestamps, and the mode they have been
recorded in. A single log shows APDUs of the NFC traffic
with their timestamp, a hexadecimal binary dump of data, and
an indicator of the originator device (reader or tag).
NFCGate allows exporting and importing logs in the
pcapng file format, providing interoperability with other tools
such as the protocol analyzer Wireshark [16]. In order to en-
code captured APDUs, ISO/IEC 14443 framing is used with
the predefined DLT_ISO_14443 link type. Since no predefined
link type exists for storing static tag data, the user-defined link
type DLT_USER_0 is used instead. Because APDUs are cap-
tured without their associated header or checksum, NFCGate
creates an artificial header of type I_BLOCK with a direction
indicator of either PICC→PCD or PCD→PICC and a flag bit
Table 2: Comparing original PoC to current NFCGate version.
PoC Current version of NFCGate
OS version max. 6 max. 10
Architecture ARMv7 Added ARM64
Chipsets Broadcom Any NCI
Technologies A Added B, F
Modes Clone, relay Added replay, on-device capture
Interoperability - Added logging, import/export,
Python plugin system
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0 8 16 24 32
n ID1 Len1 Val1
. . .
IDn Lenn Valn
. . .
Figure 2: Format of NCI configuration parameters.
Table 3: Available NCI config parameters per technology.
Tech. Prefix Parameter IDs
NFC-A LA_ NFCID1, SEL_INFO, BIT_FRAME_SDD,
PLATFORM_CONFIG, HIST_BY
NFC-B LB_ NFCID0, APPLICATION_DATA, SFGI,
SENSB_INFO, ADC_FO, H_INFO_RSP
NFC-F LF_ T3T_IDENTIFIERS_1, T3T_FLAGS,
T3T_PMM
to ignore the missing checksum. This framing of APDUs with
ISO/IEC 14443 headers enables the use of Wireshark’s proto-
col dissector [35] and its sub-dissectors such as ISO/IEC 7816
[36] for analysis.
4.2 Clone Mode
Despite the HCE API on Android not supporting static tag
data emulation, the lower-level NCI stack allows setting arbi-
trary tag data. Using symbol hooking, NFCGate gains access
to the lower-level NCI stack, which allows the clone mode
to emulate any captured static tag data. Note that while even
some dedicated hardware restricts the range of values allowed
to be manually set, no such restrictions were encountered
using the Android NCI stack.
The NCI standard defines the CORE_SET_CONFIG_CMD
command to configure the NFC discovery in poll and lis-
ten mode. When emulating a tag (listen mode), the NFCC
uses the supplied configuration stream to initialize itself. In
the NCI implementation [5], the NFC_SetConfig function is
used for sending a configuration stream to the NFCC. Us-
ing this function with custom configuration options allows
NFCGate to set the static tag data.
Figure 2 shows the format of the configuration stream. n is
the total number of options in the stream, while IDi, Leni, and
Vali specify the identifier, length in octets, and value of the
configuration parameter. Table 3 lists the relevant parameter
IDs for the emulation of static tag data in any technology
supported by Android HCE.
The NCI library also invokes NFC_SetConfig at different
times, such as when starting RF discovery, overwriting the
configuration set by NFCGate. In order to protect its custom
set configuration and increase reliability, this function is al-
(A) (B) (D) (E)(C)
Figure 3: NFCGate relay setup with external server.
tered using symbol hooking. The hook removes configuration
parameters that would overwrite the custom values before
passing them to the original function. This not only ensures
that the custom configuration stays active at all times, but also
allows NFCGate to save the rejected values and apply them
after closing clone mode to restore the NFCC to its normal
operating state.
While this mode allows the emulation of static tag data, it
does not support responding to any APDU commands. De-
spite this restriction, clone mode is useful when static tag data
(i.e., the NFCID) is used for access control as seen in [18],
since it only requires one device running NFCGate.
4.3 Relay Mode
Extending clone mode, the relay mode forwards received AP-
DUs and static tag data to a server, as well as sending APDUs
received from the server back to the tag or reader. Figure 3
shows the interaction of a legitimate tag (A), a legitimate
reader (E), and two devices running NFCGate in reader (B)
and tag mode (D) connected to the server (C). When the server
receives data from NFCGate, it now processes the data by
filtering it through all enabled plugins before broadcasting
the potentially modified data to all other connected NFCGate
devices in the same session. Plugins are invoked in a user-
specified order and able to fully modify data, in accordance
with the Dolev-Yao model [19]. The server is written in the
Python programming language and does not require external
dependencies, which enables hosting the server directly on
smartphones with any Python interpreter.
In relay mode, NFCGate devices choose between the two
roles reader and tag, while logging all data in the pcapng
format (see Section 4.1). Using two connected NFCGate de-
vices, one as the reader and one as the tag, in a setup similar
to Figure 3, enables a user to capture NFC traffic between a
legitimate tag and reader in NFC-enabled systems.
4.4 Replay Mode
In replay mode, NFCGate uses previously captured logs to
communicate with an NFC device. As in relay mode, it sup-
ports the two roles reader and tag. The role specifies which
side of the recorded NFC traffic to replay to the device. For
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example, when using the tag role, NFCGate emulates a tag,
similar to clone mode. When the reader sends APDUs to NFC-
Gate, it responds with the corresponding tag APDU taken
from the selected log. Multiple options exist for the selection
of the APDU to replay: In index-based mode, the selection
is only based on the position in the log, while the data-based
replay selects responses based on the contents of the request
APDU. All replay traffic is recorded in a new log for further
analysis. In addition to replaying unmodified traffic from the
log, NFCGate supports advanced replay over the network.
This setting routes all traffic over the server, allowing for
modifications or replacements of the replayed traffic by server
plugins before sending it to the NFC device. By not requiring
a second device running NFCGate, active attacks on an NFC
protocol using replay mode have a lower response latency
than attacks in relay mode, which could potentially bypass
relay countermeasures based on timing.
4.5 On-Device Capture
The on-device capture mode supports capturing low-level
NFC traffic of the Android device while reading or emulating
an NFC tag. NFCGate hooks central functions in the NFC
service, allowing it to capture the entire traffic without inter-
fering with other apps. This enables undetected capturing of
the NFC traffic from other apps without requiring any relay
setup, thus avoiding problems with latencies introduced by a
relay.
We hook the transceive method of the NFCService [7]
after its execution to capture NFC traffic of the device while
reading a tag. This method receives data to be sent to the
currently active tag, with the tag’s response in the return value.
When the device discovers a tag, it invokes the dispatchTag
method of NfcDispatcher [6], which is hooked to enable
capturing the static tag data.
In HCE mode, the HostEmulationManager [3] man-
ages the routing of data to apps registered with differ-
ent AIDs. On discovery of the tag device by an external
reader, onHostEmulationActivated is called. Whenever
the reader transmits data, onHostEmulationData receives
this data and routes it to the correct application. Hooking
this method captures NFC traffic from a reader to the device
in HCE mode, even if no AID is registered or the APDU
is not compatible with ISO/IEC 7816-4. This circumvents
the Android system restriction on the initial reader APDU.
Any response of the HCE application is routed through the
NFCService.sendData function, hence hooking this func-
tion also enables capturing NFC traffic from the device to the
reader.
All hooks collect the captured data locally within the con-
text of the NFC service. The NFCGate app requests these
captures from the service through broadcasts and intents. In
order to be exported and used in any other NFCGate mode,
the capture is logged in the context of the app.
5 Case Study: Smart Door Lock
In order to demonstrate the capabilities of NFCGate in an-
alyzing NFC protocols using off-the-shelf smartphones, we
conduct a case study on an NFC-based locking system.
5.1 Overview
The subject of our case study is an enterprise-level electronic
access control system manufactured by a well-known Euro-
pean security vendor1. We choose this product based on the
existing reputation of the vendor for physical locking mecha-
nisms, the security award the product had received, and the
fact that it was available as an off-the-shelf solution unlike, for
example, NFC-based hotel door locking systems. The system
consists of a base station and cylinder locks, with permissions
for each component bound to user accounts manageable via a
web interface. A user issues actions such as unlocking doors
with a transponder or an app compatible with the Android
and iOS operating systems. In this paper, we focus on the
NFC-based cylinder unlocking mechanisms, leaving aside
communication with the base station. Our hardware setup
consists of the base station, one cylinder lock, and two DES-
Fire transponders. In addition to the hardware, we use the
reader software, which is capable of adding transponders to
the deployment.
The base station contains the web-based user, cylinder, and
permission management. The lock connects to the base station
wirelessly with a proprietary protocol in the 868.3 MHz band,
requesting authorization and configuration parameters. The
transponder presents itself to the lock using the NFC protocol
described in Section 5.2 when in range. Then, the lock checks
the unique identifier UID obtained from the transponder by
sending this information to the base station. If this UID is
authorized to access the lock, it accepts the transponder and
unlocks the cylinder.
5.2 Unlocking Procedure
Using the relay mode of NFCGate, several communications
between lock and transponder were recorded and exported in
the pcapng format. Even though the locking protocol does not
conform to ICS, NFCGate circumvents the Android limitation
and allows us to receive arbitrary APDUs. Analyzing the
captured traffic using a combination of Wireshark and the
libfreefare source code [17] as a reference, we were able to
reverse-engineer the protocol used by the locking system.
The lock uses a modified DESFire AES authentication
protocol to derive a session key and to establish an authen-
ticated and encrypted channel to the transponder. It is not
immediately clear why the protocol was modified. Using the
established channel, the transponder transmits its UID to the
lock securely.
1Results published with consent of the vendor.
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Figure 4 shows the protocol for the unlocking procedure.
Deviations from the DESFire AES authentication protocol
are marked in red. The key k is a pre-shared 128-bit AES key.
The encryption and decryption routines, Enc and Dec, use
AES-128 in CBC mode. The initialization vector (IV) for the
cryptographic operations is stored in the variables IVA and
IVB. The secure channel uses AES-128 in CBC mode with
CMAC for authentication in the routines AEnc and ADec.
Initially, the PICC picks a random nonce rB and sends it to
the PCD encrypted with the pre-shared key k. Receiving this
message, PCD decrypts rB and sends its own nonce rA and the
rotated r∗B to PICC. At this point, the protocol deviates from
DESFire authentication by using a static value for rA and not
updating the IV used for encryption. This results in message
m5.1 being encrypted under IV = 0 while PICC expects IV =
m4. Therefore, PICC decrypts m5.1 with IV = m4 and obtains
r′A = rA⊕m4 with r′A 6= rA. If the decrypted r∗B matches the
local rotation of rB the PICC accepts the authentication and
derives the session key ks. Finally, it sends the rotated r′∗A to
the PCD. In order to reconcile the difference between r′∗A and
the expected r∗A, the PCD needs to calculate r
′
A = rA⊕m4.
After checking that the received r′∗A matches the local rotation
of r′A, the PCD accepts the authentication and derives the
PCD PICC
k, IVA← 0 k, IVB← 0
rA rB ←${0,1}128
Select Application 1
OK
AES Authenticate with key 0
rB←Deck (m4) m4← Enck (rB)
IVA not updated
r∗B← Rot(rB) m5 = (m5.1,m5.2)← Enck (rA||r
∗
B) IVB← m4
IVA← m5.2 (r′A,r∗B)←Deck (m5)
Check Rot(rB) = r∗B
IVB← m5.2
r′∗A ←Deck (m6) m6← Enck (r
′∗
A ) r′∗A ← Rot(r′A)
r′A← rA⊕m4
Check Rot(r′A) = r′∗A
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ks← r′A[1...4]||rB[1...4]||r′A[12...16]||rB[12...16] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Get tag UID
UID← ADecks (m7) m7← AEncks (UID)
Figure 4: Cylinder unlocking procedure.
session key ks. Since the PICC only knows r′A, the session key
must be derived from it instead of rA.
Concluding the interaction, the PICC sends its UID over
the encrypted and authenticated channel using the established
session key ks. All encrypted channel communication contains
a CMAC-based authentication tag alongside the plaintext, in
accordance with the DESFire AES authentication protocol.
5.3 Security Issues
In this section, we discuss security-related issues in the de-
sign and implementation of the cylinder unlocking proce-
dure. Proof of concept attacks facilitate NFCGate’s features
to demonstrate their applicability in real-world scenarios us-
ing off-the-shelf hardware. Figure 5 shows the different attack
setups. We consider the adversary A in the Dolev-Yao model
[19], who can capture, block, modify, and resend captured
messages all without breaking the cryptographic primitives.
Relay Attack. With NFCGate’s relay mode we are able
to forward the NFC traffic between PICC and PCD over a
network. A employs two smartphones running NFCGate con-
nected to the server, one acting as the reader and the other as
the tag. They communicate with the transponder and cylin-
der while transmitting NFC traffic to the server. As long as
the unlocking procedure takes less than ≈ 1.8s, it leads to
a successful unlocking of the cylinder. Considering the av-
erage network delay around half the globe [Frankfurt/Main
(Germany) to Sydney (Australia)] is ≈ 360ms [57] we could
successfully unlock the cylinder from around the world. This
demonstrates that the time limit imposed by the cylinder is not
an effective countermeasure to these kinds of attacks. In addi-
tion to tightening the timings, distance bounding techniques
could be used as further mitigations (see Section 7).
Replay Attack. Using messages previously captured dur-
ing an unlocking procedure between the cylinder and an autho-
rized transponder,A replays the traffic employing NFCGate in
the tag role. As a result of the protocol modifications outlined
in Figure 4 and in contrast to the replay-protected DESFire
authentication protocol, the unlocking procedure used by the
cylinder is vulnerable to replaying the communication. Due
to the static nonce rA used by the PCD and the zero-initialized
IVA and IVB, the randomness of the protocol entirely depends
on the nonce rB chosen by the PICC as shown in Figure 4.
Replaying PICC messages to the PCD results in the same
randomness, leading to the same session key ks. Since the
encrypted channel relies only on ks and the content of the
messages, which is always the same UID, an identical ks
leads to the exact same messages. This replay attack does
not require knowledge of any encryption key or breaking any
primitive in the protocol. Conforming to the DESFire proto-
col by choosing the nonce rA randomly instead of statically
mitigates replay attacks.
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Figure 5: Attack setups with cylinder (PCD), transponder (PICC), and adversary A .
Walk-By Attack. Because the secret key k used for encryp-
tion in the authentication phase is static for all cylinders and
transponders, we can extract this key from the freely available
utility software. This application allows the registration of
new transponders to the system without requiring the physical
presence of a cylinder by using a separately sold USB NFC
reader. The slightly obfuscated key k can be extracted from
the software by reverse-engineering the application binary.
Therefore, we now consider k to be known to A and adapt our
model to include the encryption and decryption of protocol
messages.
The static key allows the implementation of the PCD role in
the unlocking procedure as an NFCGate server plugin. Since
the plugin reads the UID of transponders without requiring
access to a cylinder, it simplifies the relay attack discussed
earlier. In this walk-by attack, A can obtain the authorization
by requesting the UID from a transponder, without needing
an active connection to the cylinder. Additionally, this al-
lows the creation of multiple copies of a single transponder,
thus violating the software design where every transponder is
uniquely mapped to exactly one user.
Walk-by attacks could be mitigated by using individual
keys for each deployment, since the key is only available to
users of this particular system. Even if an adversary A had
access to the key k of their own system, no attacks on other
systems would be possible. In addition, extracting k from
a transponder or cylinder is not trivial because it requires
destructive physical access to the hardware.
Privilege Escalation and Brute-Force Attack. Compar-
ing UIDs obtained from different transponders in consecutive
production batches indicates the presence of a pattern. The
UIDs have 7 bytes, where the first byte specifies the tag’s
manufacturer, in our case 04 for NXP. The remaining 6 bytes
do not seem to be chosen at random, instead tags from the
same batch have similar byte sequences. This suggests a serial
number pattern. The numerical difference between the exam-
ined UIDs of our two transponders with the same production
date and consecutive batches is 3596.
If A has access to a transponder in a system without autho-
rization to unlock a specific cylinder, they can use the static
key k to extract the UID of their transponder. This signifi-
cantly reduces the number of guesses required for other UIDs
since tags of the system were likely produced in the same or
close production batches. Guessing a UID correctly escalates
privileges of A to other cylinders. A plugin for the NFCGate
server implements brute-forcing UIDs, optionally starting
from a known value. It achieves a throughput of approxi-
mately three tries per second since the cylinder implements
no limit on the number of authorization tries. In our example,
it would take around 20 minutes to execute such an attack.
These attacks can be mitigated by using a random number
as authorization instead of the predictable UID. This random
number would be stored on the tag protected by the existing
authentication protocol. Furthermore, using individual keys
per base station instead of a static key k hinders the execution
of this attack. Adding brute-force countermeasures by limit-
ing the number of authorization tries in a specific time frame
significantly slows down any brute-force attempt.
5.4 Responsible Disclosure
We contacted the vendor to report our findings, and received
an initial response within four hours. After providing the
vendor with our report, we discussed the discovered issues
in a telephone conference and an in-person meeting. The
issues will be fixed in the next revision of the system, and the
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vendor aims to provide patches to existing customers. The
entire process was handled in a professional and collaborative
manner.
6 Performance Evaluation
After demonstrating the capabilities of the software in this
case study, we also evaluate the delays induced by NFCGate in
relay and replay mode for more general cases. In this section,
we investigate whether an upper bound on the response time
imposed by the PCD could be a viable protection mechanism
against relay attacks by determining the additional latency in
comparison to a direct communication between a PCD and a
PICC. One such upper bound could be imposed by the Frame
Waiting Time (FWT) as defined in ISO/IEC 14443.
The evaluation consists of measuring the response time
of a common command sequence for retrieving a value of a
card in various PICC configurations. We use a PN532 chipset
connected to a computer via USB/UART as the PCD and mea-
sure the command response time of the PICC. The original
Mifare DESFire tag operates in ISO/IEC 7816 ICS mode. In
particular, the measured commands are:
1. ICS SELECT file: DESFire AID (0xA4)
2. Select Application (0x5A)
3. Get FileSettings (0xF5)
4. Get Value (0x6C)
The NFCGate app runs on one Nexus 5X (Android 7)
smartphone in the tag role and one OnePlus 6 (Android 9)
smartphone in the reader role, while the NFCGate server is
hosted directly on the Nexus 5X or a computer. In addition
to a baseline measurement, where the PCD communicates
with the original tag (TAG), we measure the latency in the
following configurations:
RP Local replay. One smartphone replays previously cap-
tured NFC traffic locally to the PCD. No additional
smartphone or server is used.
BT Bluetooth relay. Smartphones connected via a Bluetooth
PAN. The server is hosted on one of the smartphones.
BW Bluetooth tethering to wireless network. One smartphone
provides IEEE 802.11 wireless network access to the
other via Bluetooth tethering. The server is hosted on a
computer wired to the network.
WH IEEE 802.11 wireless hotspot. One smartphone offers
a wireless network access point to the other one. The
server is hosted on the smartphone providing the access
point.
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Figure 6: Latency measurements using NFCGate.
WA IEEE 802.11 wireless network. Both smartphones are
connected to the same wireless network. The server is
hosted on a computer wired to the network.
Every configuration using wireless technologies is con-
ducted in an urban environment with multiple other wireless
networks in active use.
Figure 6 depicts the total latency of command responses
for the different configurations as a box plot (n = 20) with
outliers, minima, maxima, median, and the lowest/highest val-
ues within 1.5 interquartile range. Dashed lines show values
for the FWT , where FWTj is only drawn for 8 ≤ j ≤ 11,
because FWT8 is the minimum FWT specified by the orig-
inal tag and any FWTj with j ≥ 12 is out of bounds. For
FWT ≥ FWT11 ≈ 619ms, the latency stays within FWT
bounds for all tested configurations, excluding some outliers.
We note that the replay mostly stays within the FWT of the
original tag and is in some cases indistinguishable from it.
All network configurations using the IEEE 802.11 wire-
less network standard with both smartphones exhibit a high
variance in latency measurements while Bluetooth-based con-
figurations appear to be more stable. We attribute the high vari-
ance to interference in the IEEE 802.11 wireless network and
the stable Bluetooth measurements to the low data throughput
in our evaluation. Therefore, we recommend a Bluetooth PAN
configuration for close proximity relays.
7 Countermeasures
The FWT has been proposed as a potential countermeasure
to relay attacks [21, 55], although it was primarily designed
as a safety measure. Despite its standardization, the FWT
has not been enforced in our experiments, which seems to be
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very common [10]. Even if it was enforced, the FWT could
be increased by the PICC up to ≈ 5s. In the event of a loose
mandatory FWT enforced by the PCD, our measurements
show that it is possible to relay the communication even if
FWTj for j ≥ 10 is in use. Assuming the use of the original
tag’s FWT is mandatory, a replay could be performed never-
theless. Especially in the case of a cryptographically intensive
operation, a replay could be indistinguishable in timing from
the original tag, since it does not use cryptography. Despite
some configurations exceeding the FWT , a relay could still
be performed, because the FWT was designed as a safety
measure, not a security feature. The PCD simply retransmits
a block after the FWT expires, allowing even more time for
a relay to respond [30, Section 7.2]. This shows that FWT is
not just an ineffective countermeasure but no countermeasure
at all.
Mandatory Response Timeouts. One possible counter-
measure against relay attacks is the implementation of a tight
mandatory response timeout on the reader side. In contrast to
the FWT, this cannot be influenced by the tag and constitutes
a definitive communication timeout. Since this countermea-
sure requires knowing an upper limit on the response latency
to any connectable tag beforehand, it only works in closed
ecosystems, where all involved readers and tags are control-
lable. The duration of cryptographic operations in particular
depends on hardware instruction support and performance, so
low-end HCE devices might raise the upper limit on response
latency, which would in turn reduce the effectiveness of this
countermeasure.
Distance Bounding Protocols. First introduced by Brands
and Chaum [13], distance bounding (DB) protocols solve
the general issue of relay attacks. In a DB protocol, physical
properties of a connection are used to prove that one endpoint
is within a specified distance of the other. In addition to timing
and freshness, some DB protocols employ cryptography to
ensure the authenticity of endpoints [11, 12].
DB for NFC can be implemented on either the protocol or
application layer. An implementation on the protocol layer
requires an extension to the ISO/IEC 14443 standard and
performs DB independently of the application [20, 25, 47].
While this simplifies the usage for many applications, it only
measures the distance to some recipient, not necessarily the in-
tended one. In contrast, an implementation on the application
layer can ensure the correct recipient, but requires every ap-
plication to implement their own, incompatible DB protocol
[15, 26, 39].
One example for an application layer DB protocol is the
DESFire EV2 Proximity Check [27]. The check uses cryptog-
raphy to ensure mutual authentication at the end of the timing
phase. Despite these engineering efforts, an attack against the
DB protocol has already been discovered [14].
8 Conclusion
With NFCGate, we have enhanced the original PoC to an
extensive NFC research toolkit that is compatible with any
Android smartphones supporting the Xposed or EdXposed
hooking framework and requires no changes to the system im-
age. The interoperability proved invaluable in the case study,
since it allowed us to further inspect the captured traffic in
Wireshark with its existing NFC protocol dissectors. Using
the toolkit, we analyzed a well-known NFC-based door lock-
ing system and uncovered several security issues of various
severities. We launched a brute-force attack against the UID
used as authorization employing the NFCGate server plugin
feature. By informing the vendor of our case study, several
security issues could be fixed, which helped secure a currently
deployed product. The evaluation showed that the relay la-
tency is low enough to bypass many countermeasures, while
the negligible replay latency makes it almost indistinguishable
from the original tag.
As future work, the Wireshark remote capturing proto-
col could be implemented, streaming the captured data from
NFCGate to a running live capture to simplify the use of the
pcapng export. Finally, we suggest using the on-device cap-
ture mode to further analyze HCE-based apps such as Google
Pay, or inspect NFC reader apps, e.g. public transport services.
Availability
We make the source code of NFCGate available to the public
under a free software license [53].
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